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While Lenin considers human knowledge similar to a mirror-like 
reflection of the object, Bogdanov emphasizes the creative role of 
the subject in organizing the world. On the basis of some textual 
evidences, it seems possible to illustrate the epistemologies of the 
two fields into which Russian Marxism divides at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, in terms of the two metaphors of 
photography on the one hand, and cinema on the other. In 
particular, while discussing Einstein's relativity, Bogdanov 
considers sense organs, memory, and all the apparatus of human 
knowledge “as a certain kind of cinematographic device”; 
Einsenstein deems that cinema is “an excellent instrument of 
perception … for the sensation of movement”. Although it is 
difficult to find compelling proofs of exchanges and influences, this 
is an actual ‘tangential point’ between Bogdanov and Eisenstein's 
ideas on human knowledge. 
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In intellectual history, influences of ideas are a major topic, and 
also a very difficult one: in order to prove contacts or impacts of ideas 
one has to demonstrate connections, readings, discussions, comments, 
notes... This is the intriguing and fascinating detective side of the 
intellectual historian's work, looking for the “smoking guns” which 
definitely prove relationships, exchanges, influences. In the case of 
Bogdanov and Eisenstein, both extremely compelling figures in early 
Soviet thought, we shall consider that, though belonging to different 
generations, they shared a common milieu, the Proletkult movement of 
the 1920s, where Bogdanov was a leading figure, and the young 
Einsenstein took part in discussions and writings within the Proletkult 
organization (Tikka 2009; Biggart 2016). Einsenstein, however, did not 
explicitly refer to Bogdanov in his works, nor did he openly discuss the 
latter’s ideas. Their relationships need to be examined by a variety of 
interdisciplinary methods, which only a wide collective effort will 
probably be able to achieve. To such a picture I should like to add some 
curious details. 
Bogdanov was interested in cinema long before the revolution, 
and maintained that cinema could be used to educate the new 
proletarian class. This is not surprising: Bogdanov had a serious 
scientific education, and he was very interested in technology in general. 
In his first utopian novel, Red Star, Bogdanov imagines innovative uses 
for both photography and cinema. In 1907 he noted the already 
existing application of photography in photo-telescopes: on Mars there 
were telescopes which take pictures so precise and detailed that they 
could be enlarged in order to show details invisible to the naked eye. 
Menni, a technician, explains to the author's alter ego, Leonid, that the 
“direct-vision magnification” of a certain telescope “is about 600, (…) 
but when that is insufficient we take a photograph and examine it under 
a microscope, which raises the power to 60,000 or more” (Bogdanov 
1984: 40). 
On Mars, photos are also used to hold attention alive during 
presentations. Another Martian character, Enno, gives “a fascinating 
account” of a distant planet, “its deep, storm-tossed oceans and 
towering mountains, its scorching sun and thick white clouds, terrible 
hurricanes and thunderstorms, grotesque monsters and majestic giant 
plants. He illustrated his lecture with moving pictures on a screen which 
took up an entire wall of the auditorium”. Leonid notices that “Enno's 
voice was the only sound to be heard in the darkness; the audience was 
plunged into deep concentration” (Bogdanov 1984: 72–73). A person so 
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deeply interested in the development of a new sort of “pedagogy” in 
order to develop proletarian culture, as Bogdanov was through his 
whole life, was obviously thinking of pedagogical applications of those 
new powerful means of representation and communication. 
On Mars, cinema turns out to be very powerful. In respect of its 
technical potential, Bogdanov's imagination extended beyond 
development of sound cinema, which was already being experimented 
with on Earth, and envisages 3D movies. He writes:  
“the theater in our little town had one feature that held 
particular fascination for me, namely the fact that no actors performed 
there at all. The plays were either transmitted from distant large cities 
by means of audiovisual devices, or – more usually – they were 
cinematic reproductions of plays performed long ago, sometimes so long 
ago that the actors themselves were already dead. The Martians have 
mastered the technique of instantaneous color photography and use it 
to capture life in motion, much as in our cinema theaters. But not only 
do they combine the camera with the phonograph, as we are thus far 
rather unsuccessfully beginning to do on Earth, they also employ the 
principle of the stereoscope to give the moving pictures natural depth. 
Two images, the two halves of the stereogram, are projected 
simultaneously onto the screen, and in front of each seat in the 
auditorium is fastened a set of binoculars, which combines the two flat 
pictures into three-dimensional ones. It was eerie to watch people 
moving, acting, and expressing their thoughts and feelings as vividly and 
distinctly as in real life and yet know that there was actually nothing 
there but a plate of frosted glass in front of a phonograph and an 
electric light operated by a clockwork mechanism. It was a weird, 
almost mystical phenomenon that filled me with a vague sense of 
unreality” (Bogdanov 1984: 87-88).  
The last sentence of this amazing description of the 3D Martian 
movie theater is especially significant. According to Bogdanov, cinema 
turns out to be the best technical means of ‘reproducing’ reality in such 
a faithful, precise way that reproduction could be completely confused 
with reality, in a sort of ‘mystical’ experience. 
In fact, the problem of the relationship between perception and 
reality was a central topic of discussion among Russian Marxists at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, just as it became – again – in the 
1920s. Within a common materialistic framework, which necessarily 
considers human beings as a part of the material world, and sense 
perception as the first, basic connection between knowing subject and 
known object, one can illustrate the epistemologies of the two fields into 
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which Russian Marxism divides at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, in terms of the two metaphors of photography on the one 
hand, and cinema on the other. 
It is well known that Lenin proposed his own epistemology as 
the only one that was consistent with “orthodox” Marxism, which relied 
on the whole history of materialism as opposed to idealism. As Friedrich 
Engels stated in his Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy, in the whole history of thought philosophers split into two 
great fields: “Those who asserted the primacy of the mind over nature 
(...) comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature 
as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism” (Marx and 
Engels 1990: 366). As far as epistemology is concerned, consequently, 
materialists explain human knowledge starting from the impressions 
that the external objects provide on the sense organs of the human 
body. Such a fundamental empiricism was considered as a sound point 
for Russian ‘orthodox’ Marxism. However, G. V. Plekhanov, the well-
known ‘father of Russian Marxism’, whom Lenin openly declared to be 
his own ‘master’ in philosophy1, had developed a peculiar ‘theory of 
hieroglyphics’ relying both on the philosophical tradition of French 
eighteenth century materialism, and modern physiology (Steila 1991). 
According to him, our impressions are undeniably subjective and 
cannot be identified with the material movements, which are their 
objective bases and which excite our sensations. However, there is an 
exact correspondence between the objective conditions of the thing and 
the sensation we feel when it stimulates our sense organs. Plekhanov 
concluded: “Our sensations are some kind of hieroglyphics that make us 
aware of what is happening in reality. Hieroglyphics do not resemble 
the events they communicate, but they are capable of communicating 
with absolute accuracy the events themselves and – what is of prime 
importance – the relations which exist between them”2 (Plekhanov 
1956: 501). So, according to Plekhanov, the ‘truth’ of our sensations did 
not consist in their being a ‘mirror image’ of things, but in their 
providing us with undistorted representations of the real relations 
between things or events. Lenin, however, deemed this to be the 
weakest point in Plekhanov’s thought: “Plekhanov was guilty of an 
                                                            
1 See V. I. Lenin, “Kak chut’ li ne potukhla “Iskra”?”, in Lenin 1960: 343; 
“Eshche raz o profsojuzakh, o tekushchem momente i ob oshibkakh tt. Trockogo i 
Bukharina”, in Lenin 1969b: 290. 
 
2  G. V. Plekhanov, “Predislovie k pervomu izdaniju ('Ot perevodchika') i 
primechanija Plekhanova k knige F. Engel’sa: Ludwig Feuerbach i konec klassicheskoj 
nemetskoj filosofii, in Plekhanov 1956: 501. 
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obvious mistake in his exposition of materialism” (Lenin 1962: 238). 
Lenin compared Plekhanov’s theory of hieroglyphs with Hermann von 
Helmholtz’s views on perception and experience, and endorsed 
Albrecht Rau’s criticism of the latter, in order to criticize Plekhanov. 
Lenin wrote: “an image can never wholly compare with the model, but 
an image is one thing, a symbol, a conventional sign, another. The image 
inevitably and of necessity implies the objective reality of that which it 
‘images’. ‘Conventional sign,’ symbol, hieroglyph are concepts that 
introduce an entirely unnecessary element of agnosticism” (Lenin 1962: 
235). 
Instead of Plekhanov’s unnecessary emphasis on conventional 
signs, Lenin proposed his own theory of knowledge as ‘reflection’, which 
he considered much more consistent with the whole tradition of 
philosophical materialism. According to his views, the camera is a good 
way of explaining how we know reality. In Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism one reads that “objective reality (…) is given to man by his 
sensations, and (…) is copied, photographed and reflected by our 
sensations, while existing independently of them” (Lenin 1962: 130). 
Any photographer would object that the camera is by no means a 
‘neutral’ instrument for the reproduction of reality: owing to its 
technical characteristics it provides us with a two-dimensional account 
of three-dimensional reality. Besides, at the beginning of the century, 
colour reproduction was far from being precise. Finally, as we know 
very well, in any picture it is always the author's ‘cut’ that defines what 
is actually photographed. 
Nevertheless, the camera is often considered even now, in 
popular understanding, as a reliable means of reproducing reality, as a 
sort of reflecting mirror. The image we see in the mirror is also not at all 
identical with the real object, and the same is true for our perceptions, 
as has been well known since ancient times, and as the huge 
philosophical literature on the topic of ‘sense-deception’ testifies. What 
the example of the camera as a faithful reproducing device really means 
to say, is that in spite of the technical specificities of the camera, and the 
peculiarities of our sense organs, the object remains that object, within 
the photo as well as within our sensations. The object exists as such 
independently of our perception or photography, which merely 
reproduces it. 
In Lenin's works the example of photography as faithful 
reproduction of reality is actually used very rarely. Lenin used the word 
‘photography’ in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, as we have shown, but 
also once again in 1909, referring to a polemical article he was writing: 
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Ideological Decay and Disunity Among Russian Social-Democrats. He wrote that 
this essay was “an instantaneous photograph of one of the rivulets of 
that broad torrent of ideological confusion” (Lenin 1963: 109).3 which 
gave rise to different ideological movements dividing Russian Social-
Democracy. Again, photograph means a representation of reality, in 
this case a quite complex reality, corresponding to the picture itself. 
This meaning of the word photograph was already wide-spread 
in Russian scientific literature at the end of the nineteenth century. For 
instance the well-known physiologist I.M. Sechenov wrote in 1892: 
“The eye refers to forms and movements, like a photographic record, 
capable of clearly perceiving not only motionless, but also moving 
forms; therefore the similarity between what is sensed and the real is 
here as tangible as the similarity between a human being's face and his 
or her photo”4. 
 Sechenov was one of the authorities Plekhanov relied on while 
developing his theory of hieroglyphs, but Lenin did not take this into 
account when criticizing Plekhanov5. He preferred to maintain that 
Sechenov was a leading figure of Russian science6. Photography was in 
general considered as a good representative of realistic mirror-like 
knowledge within materialism, and not only by Lenin. Cinema, on the 
contrary, is never used by Lenin as a metaphor for knowledge. In his 
works one can find only a few passing references to the topic, mainly 
relating to propaganda documentaries and their possible impact (for 
instance in 1913 in order to criticize its ideological use by German 
Catholics or Taylorist capitalists; or after the revolution to support its 
ideological use for the benefit of the victorious revolution)7.  
Amongst those Marxists who were critical of Lenin and 
Plekhanov's ‘orthodoxy’, photos were not considered at all as a good 
example of how knowledge works. One of the first to reject the analogy 
                                                            
3  V.I. Lenin,  “Ideological Decay and Disunity Among Russian Social-
Democrats”, in Lenin 1963: 109. 
4  I.M. Sechenov, “Predmetnaja mysl' i dejstvitel'nost'” (1892), in Sechenov 
1952: 472. 
5  When criticizing Plekhanov's theory of knowledge, Lenin rather 
considered it to have derived from Helmholtz's positions. On the connections of 
Plekhanov, Sechenov and Helmholtz, see Steila 1991. 
6 Lenin asked his mother to send to him in Geneve a copy of Sechenov's 
recent book Elementy mysli in 1904 (see Lenin 1975: 233). 
7 See V. I. Lenin, “'Nauchnaja' sistema vyzhimanija pota” and 
“Organizatsija mass nemetskimi katolikami”, in Lenin 1973: 18, 188-190; 
“Osnovnye zadachi diktatury proletariata v Rossii”, in Lenin 1969a: 95-96; 
“Ukazanija o rabote agitatsionno-instruktorskikh poezdov i parakhodov”, in Lenin 
1974: 72-73; “Tezisy o proizvodstvennoj propagande”, in Lenin 1970a: 16; 
“Direktivy po kinodelu”, in Lenin 1970b: 360-361. 
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was Joseph Dietzgen, who was very popular in Russia at the beginning 
of the twentieth century amongst the so-called Machian Marxists, i. e., 
the opponents of Lenin (Steila 2013: 237–251). Marx himself had 
described Dietzgen as a representative of “autodidactic philosophy – 
pursued by workers themselves” (reference).8, Engels had written that 
this German worker could understand dialectics by himself, 
independently of Hegel (reference).9. At the same time, Ernst Mach, in 
the Preface to the Russian translation of his Analysis of Sensations, wrote 
that “J. Dietzgen … has reached conclusions very similar to those 
presented in this book” (Mach 1908: 4). Similarities between Dietzgen's 
positions and Machian thought (the ideas of Mach himself, and those of 
his Russian followers) were often emphasized at that moment (Kautsky 
1909; Jushkevich 1907: 80, 86-88; Valentinov 1908: 161-168; Dauge 
1907: VIII), and also later. In 1925, for instance, while discussing 
Bogdanov's Tectology, I. Vajnshtejn pointed out some parallels between 
Bogdanov's theory of organization and the thinking of Dietzgen 
(Vajnshtejn 1925). Indeed, Dietzgen had criticized the epistemology of 
‘reflection’ exactly by maintaining that camera does not take pictures 
conforming to reality. He wrote: “Nothing more insipid has been said of 
truth and knowledge than ... that truth is the conformity of our 
knowledge with its object. How can a picture ‘conform’ to its model? 
Approximately it can … But to be altogether alike, quite the same as the 
original, what an abnormal idea!” (Dietzgen 1906: 140). 
These topics, widely discussed within Russian Marxism at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, became again very important 
during the 1920s. Since, by this time, Bogdanov had become a 
prominent figure within the powerful Proletkult movement, and since he 
maintained, as it were, un-orthodox theoretical positions in relation to 
the basic principles of official Marxism, Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism was republished in a second edition, which became much more 
influential than the first. When the book came out for the first time in 
1909, most readers took it to be mainly as a polemical work, as part of 
the ideological struggle within the Bolshevik fraction at that time (Steila 
2013: 328–339), but in 1920, in its second edition, it was put forward as 
being an authoritative statement of Marxist orthodox epistemology. 
The post-face by V. I. Nevsky, Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of 
Dead Reaction, made it clear that Lenin's work represented Orthodoxy in 
                                                            
8 K. Marx's letter to L. Kugelmann, December 7, 1867, in Marx – Engels 
1987: 497. 
9 F. Engels, “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German 
Philosophy”, in Marx – Engels 1990: 383-384. 
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Marxist thought, and that Bogdanov was to be condemned as a 
dangerous heretic. The main charge was that “Bogdanov … obstinately 
maintains, now as before, that the physical world is ‘socially organized 
experience’” (reference)10. Furthermore, in his later works (Nevsky 
quoted Philosophy of Living Experience, Proletarian Culture, Outlines of the 
Science of Organization, Tectology...) Bogdanov had repeated the same 
mistakes that he was accused of by Lenin in Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism. In order to show which kind of mistakes these were, Nevsky 
mentioned Bogdanov's conception of the ‘physical’ as depending on 
collective experience. Bogdanov had written:  
 “Physical experience is the experience of some person, namely, 
the experience of all of humanity in its development. This is a world of a 
strict, settled, elaborated uniformity of law, of definite, precise 
correlations; it is a well-established world where all propositions of 
geometry, all formulae of mechanics, astronomy, physics, etc., are valid. 
… To understand this world, this system of experience, independently of 
humanity, is it possible to say that it existed prior to humanity?” 
(reference). 
Bogdanov had answered: “when we say that the law [of gravity – 
D.S.] was valid prior to the existence of humanity, it is not the same as 
saying independently of humanity” (Bogdanov 1913: 226–227). This was 
the breaking point between orthodox Marxist on the one hand and 
Bogdanov's science of organization on the other. Nevsky's post-face 
inflamed the discussion over Bogdanov's system of thought.  
A few years later in 1923 Bogdanov contributed to an interesting 
book on Einstein's theory of relativity. This volume included the 
translation of an extensive essay by Moritz Schlick, and some articles by 
Russians: one by Bogdanov's close friend, Vladimir Bazarov, on space 
and time in the light of the new theory; Bogdanov's essay on the theory 
of relativity from the organizational point of view; and a work by Pavel 
Jushkevich on the philosophical meaning of relativity. Bogdanov 
maintained that Einstein's theory was of great importance for his own 
general science of organization. From such a standpoint, “the question 
of the correlations between a complex (any kind of – physical, 
biological, psychical, social) and its environment” turns out to be one a 
key problem (Bogdanov 1923: 101)11. Einstein's theory considers the 
                                                            
10 V. Nevsky, “Dialectical Materialism and the Philosophy of Dead 
Reaction”, in Lenin 1927: 331. 
11 Bogdanov wrote on this topic another article (Bogdanov 1924), which was 
mainly a discussion of Timirjazev's ideas on relativity. 
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movement of physical bodies as a specific case of such a general 
problem. In Bogdanov's words:  
 “Transfer represents a particular case of interaction of a body 
with its environment, a special case: the body loses and gains not 
energy, but the link with its environment, loses a link (spatial contact) 
with some elements, gains a link with others. Conventional thinking sees 
there two facts: 1) the environment itself is not moving; 2) the body 
moves. The theory of relativity works on the premise that here there is 
one fact, not two. It is the correlation of two sides that changes; 
depending on the position of the knowing subject, this might be 
expressed in one way, or another” (Bogdanov 1923: 102).  
In order to understand movement from the standpoint of the 
theory of relativity, more than one observer is needed. Classic physics 
assumed one observer, the new physics requires a sort of collective, 
social engagement:  
 “Since a single observer cannot occupy two positions at the same 
time, even mentally, the question of coordination appears to be 
essentially a specific organizational-social task: to unify, to connect the 
knowledge of two observers, one of whom is really or mentally attached 
to the moving body, the other to its environment, whilst each of them 
operates with his own instruments of orientation, his own system of 
space-time coordinates” (Bogdanov 1923: 104–105).  
Bogdanov was therefore able to accept Einstein's theory as a 
confirmation of his own thinking, since Einstein's theory moved toward 
a sort of “not-subjective” relativism, thereby developing farther the 
point of view of Mach (Bogdanov 1923: 121). 
The contents of this book focused on the idea that the theory of 
relativity should be considered as a confirmation of, and perhaps a 
development and regeneration of, the old Machism. Jushkevich, who 
examined the philosophical significance of Einstein's theory, wrote that 
the theory of relativity was “wholly filled with the spirit of those 
influences, which its author acknowledged, when referring to Hume and 
Mach as the thinkers who gave him conceptual inspiration for his work” 
(reference). Jushkevich concluded: “the theory of relativity is the rebirth 
of modern positivism, which receives here new confirmation and 
support” (Jushkevich 1923: 155)12. 
In his discussion of Einstein's relativity, Bogdanov made a very 
curious statement: “Our sense organs, memory, and all the scientific 
                                                            
12 Einstein himself acknowledged certain influence of Mach's ideas on his own 
positions as a young scientist (see A. Einstein, “Autobiographisches / 
Autobiographical Notes” in Schilpp 1951: 20-21; Blackmore 1972: 247-285). 
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auxiliary means for perceiving and recording facts, can be considered as 
a certain kind of cinematographic device” (Bogdanov 1923: 107). Let us 
examine the context in which this statement appears. Bogdanov is 
explaining that “the theory of relativity formulates the corrections, 
through which one can move from the projections and forms of the 
events of the system A within system B to the ‘reality’ of those events in 
the same system A, where they take place, and vice versa” (Bogdanov 
1923: 107). This possibility can be explained through the image of 
‘instantaneous photographs’ of one system, taken from the other. But at 
this point Bogdanov makes the statement quoted above, and 
emphasizes that it will be more correct and effective to compare our 
perceptive devices to cinema instead of photography. He explains:  
 “If two such devices, within the systems A and B, simultaneously 
film the other system, each “film” will be unfaithful, “distorted” when 
compared with a film taken within the same system: the representations 
of bodies will be foreshortened in the line of the movement, the very 
course of the events is slowed down (“the clock lags behind”), for each in 
the same way and from their respective vantage points. A person, for 
instance, in these ‘films’ has a certain height when standing up, and 
another when lying down. It is clear that formulae permitting one to 
move from the coordinates of one system to another should be 
understood as being formulae of correction for the passage from more or 
less distorted representations to the internal reality of each system: 
formulae of substitution (podstanovka) of things and events, to be applied 
to their perceptible forms” (Bogdanov 1923: 107)13. 
This passage is particularly interesting. Here Bogdanov puts the 
theory of relativity into his own perspective of knowledge as the 
‘construction’ of reality by collective subjects. The formulae which allow 
to move from one system to the other are called ‘formulae of 
substitution’ (podstanovka). The term ‘substitution’ (podstanovka) had been 
used by Bogdanov since Empiriomonism to mean a methodological 
approach aimed at explaining phenomena and events within life as well 
as within science (Bogdanov 1995: 53).  
                                                            
13 “Если два таких аппарата, находясь в системах А и В, делают взаимно 
съемку этих систем, то их “фильмы” будут изменены, “искажены” по 
сравнению со съемкою из своей системы: изображения тел окажутся укорочены 
по линии движения, самый ход событий замедлен (“отставание часов”), то и 
другое одинаково с обеих сторон. Человек, напр., на этих “фильмах” имеет 
один рост, когда он стоит, и другой, - когда лежит. Ясно, что формулы 
перехода от координат одной системы следует понимать как формулы поправок 
для перехода от более или менее искаженных изображений к внутренней 
действительности каждой системы, формулы подстановки вещей и событий под 
их воспринимаемые образы.” 
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According to Bogdanov: “substitution consists in the fact that 
one object or phenomenon is replaced for the purpose of cognition by 
another one, real or mental. For instance, under a work of art ‘are put’ 
certain images, sentiments, moods, which it stimulates in the person 
who reads it, looks at it, or listens to it, ‘under’ a white sun ray is put the 
sum of all those colored rays, into which it is decomposed through the 
prism, etc.” (Bogdanov 1995: 52).  
The main point for Bogdanov is that substitution is not an 
individual, but a collective method of constructing reality: “The 
principle of substitution lies in the communication among people, in their 
mutual understanding” (Bogdanov 1995: 52). Substitution is the method by 
which a human group in a certain epoch responds to the practical and 
theoretical need for a harmonious and unified worldview. Within such a 
worldview human beings can understand each other and interact with 
reality14.  
As is well known, in Bogdanov's view, experience is essentially 
social. In 1906 Bogdanov wrote: “The world of experience crystallized 
and continues to crystallize out of chaos. The force that determines the 
forms of such crystallization is the human relationship. Beyond these 
forms there is no experience, since an unorganized mass of feelings does 
not constitute an experience. Thus, experience is social in its basis, and 
its progress is the socio-psychological process of its organization, to which the 
organizing individual-psychic process completely adapts itself” 
(Bogdanov 1906: XXXIII-XXXIV).  
To understand how substitution works does not mean just to 
become aware of a sort of spontaneous process within one's own 
consciousness, but to appreciate the deep social nature of such a 
process. In one of Bogdanov's unpublished letters to Bazarov, one reads: 
“Substitution is a complicated product of social development, and it is 
particularly wrong to confuse it with the passage from perception to 
apperception. Substitution is a problem of cognitive methodology, i.e., a 
problem of the social – not just the psychological – order, and it 
emerges on the basis of social symbolism” ((reference).15 
From the standpoint of Bogdanov's thought, the theory of 
relativity could be seen as a new perspective, capable of producing a 
better form of substitution. Bogdanov considered this to be an instance 
of the ‘unifying tendency’ that was at work within natural science 
                                                            
14 More on the concept of ‘substitution’, see Steila 2009: 153–157. 
 
15 Archive Fondazione Basso. Bogdanov's Letter to Bazarov, June 21, 1911 
(see Steila 2009: 168). 
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(Bogdanov 1996: XVI). In the first book of Tektology he writes of the 
theory of relativity:  
 “Its formulation and analysis are entirely based upon the 
relationships between observers accepting these or other events, and 
upon the conditions of signaling which let them co-ordinate their 
observations. The notion of the physical environment is evidently 
expanded here in the organizational sense; it is complemented by 
elements never before taken into account, namely, enquiring beings and 
their relationships” (Bogdanov 1996: 100). 
Such a view overcomes the classic physics of the ‘single observer’ 
and creates new opportunities for epistemology to overcome the 
subjectivity of a point of view within one system and to take into 
account other systems. Communication allows people to develop a 
wider worldview. It was not fortuitous that the example Bogdanov used 
to illustrate how we can employ the formulae of substitution to move 
from one set of representations to another was a classical 
epistemological problem. Bogdanov wrote:  
 “Let us imagine a person living in a cave; its entrance is blocked 
by a optical-deforming pane; he can observe and study the external 
world only through this pane. It is evident that all the measures and 
relations in this world for that person are distorted in a certain way. In 
order to predict the positions of moving external objects, that person 
must use formulae, similar to the formulae of the general theory of 
relativity, in particular, Gaussian coordinates. But in exactly the same 
way all measures and relationships of everything that happens within 
the cave are distorted for an observer on the outside. If both sides 
succeed in identifying the properties of the medium separating them, by 
introducing corrections in their observations, they will be able to 
establish a precise picture of the things and the events” (Bogdanov 1923: 
107–108).  In other words, a new, better, substitution is achieved. 
In one endnote in the first book of Tektology, Bogdanov maintains 
that “current formulations of the ‘principle of relativity’ elaborated by 
Einstein and others do not seem to me ... to be definitive from an 
organizational point of view”, since “they always assume only two 
observers and the light signaling between them” ((reference. Bogdanov 
continued:  “For example, since direct light signaling would be 
impossible if observers were moving away from each other faster than 
the speed of light – a ray of light from one could not reach the other – 
then it is assumed that the relative speed of bodies is always less than the 
speed of light; and that the speed of light is the fastest possible speed. 
However, if we introduce into the system of coordination a third 
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observer as an intermediary between the two, we obtain a different 
result” (Bogdanov 1989: 137).  
Furthermore, if two electrons fly out from a radioactive nuclei at 
a speed close to the speed of light, “it would seem perfectly clear that 
they are objectively moving apart from each other … faster than the speed 
of light. If one could imagine individual observers located on each of 
these particles, then, through the intermediary of the observer placed 
between them, they will be able to establish this, though observations 
without an intermediary would give them a different result” ((reference). 
Bogdanov concludes that: “application of the organizational point of 
view leads to a far more simple conception of the relativity principle 
than the usual one” (Bogdanov 1989: 137–138). 
From the standpoint of the general theory of organization, it is 
perfectly understandable that human beings can change their 
frameworks, their pattern of interpretation of reality, since those 
frameworks have nothing to do with Kant's forms of cognition. 
Bogdanov emphasizes: “Truly, there are certain forms of thinking that 
people use to consolidate their experience; but they are by no means the 
eternal ‘constitution of cognitive capacities’. They are means for the 
organization of experience, which are developed and altered with the 
growth of experience and the alteration of its contents” (Bogdanov 
1996: 47). 
In Bogdanov's views the knowing subject is by no means a sort of 
a passive recorder of perceptive data, a ‘camera’ as in Lenin's 
epistemology. Instead, one could claim, the human collective is engaged 
in the production of reality and its organization, one could say in its 
‘montage’. 
We cannot find a ‘smoking gun’ that would prove evidentially 
that the young Eisenstein had read Bogdanov's epistemological essays. 
But, curiously enough, according to Eisenstein as well as Bogdanov, 
cinema could provide us with an orientation in the four-dimensional 
space-time continuum, which is implicit in Einstein's theory of relativity. 
In Eisenstein's essay The Filmic Fourth Dimension we read:  
“The fourth dimension? Einstein? Or mysticism? Or a joke? It is 
time to stop being frightened of this new knowledge of a fourth 
dimension…. Possessing such an excellent instrument of perception as 
the cinema – even on its primitive level – for the sensation of 
movement, we should soon learn a concrete orientation in this four-
dimensional space-time continuum, and feel as much at home in it as in 
our own house-slippers” (Eisenstein 1949: 69–70). 
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Cinema is “an excellent instrument of perception … for the 
sensation of movement”, according to Eisenstein ((reference). In turn, 
according to Bogdanov, “our sense organs, memory, and all the 
scientific auxiliary means to perceiving and recording facts, can be 
considered as a certain kind of cinematographic device” ((reference). 
This may not provide evidence for a direct or mutually acknowledged 
exchange of ideas between Eisenstein and Bogdanov, but it can 
certainly be regarded as a tangential point of encounter. 
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